Abstract
Introduction
Many local governments have been forced to defer infrastructure projects because of financial deficiencies. As PricewaterhouseCoopers (2006) point out, 16% of local governments having an operating deficit of around 10% of total income, a significant contributor to this problem. This emphasizes the inadequacies of local government funding not only for infrastructure, but for an increasingly service focused local government (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2006) . Both local government rates and, to a lesser degree developer charges, comprise key sources of revenue for many of the 152 local governments in NSW. These sources have undergone a number of reforms over the past 15 years, to which the changes are examined in this paper. The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of mid 2008 to the present has provided the opportunity to provide a contemporary look at the volatility of these revenues for local government in NSW.
Literature review
The literature review starts with a brief look at the finances and structure of local government in NSW. It examines municipal rates including some of its state restrictions and discusses the importance of land for land taxation in its various forms. This is followed by a review of Section 94 contributions and their use as a source of local government revenue. The literature concludes with a rationale that justifies the following comparative analysis of these two sources of revenue across local government in NSW.
Local Government and financing in New South Wales
The Australian constitution sets out the framework of government in Australia. Although local government is often referred to as a level of government, there are only two layers of government under the constitution; state and commonwealth. Local government is an instrument of state government and is governed by local government legislation in each state of Australia (Pearson 1994) .
Whilst it is an important operational layer of government, the absence of constitutional recognition restricts it's taxing and revenue raising powers. As a result many local governments in NSW are reliant on commonwealth or state government transfers in the form of grants (Mangioni 2006) .
In remedying this revenue shortfall, McGill (2010) suggests that, "national government introduce or amend local government legislation to permit councils to raise such additional revenues as they deem possible and practical".
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Despite this recommendation, any such power that conflicts with revenue raised by the states would be as rigorously challenged as the right for local government to establish itself as a level of government in Australia (McGill 2010) .
PricewaterhouseCoopers ( This leads to the question of whether councils can sustain the current arrangements. Some findings of IPART (2008) indicate that many types of councils have infrastructure backlogs which suggest a lack of capital sustainability. On the other hand, recurrent income and expenditure of more than two-thirds of councils in NSW were considered sustainable (Independant Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal 2008) .
According to the report by the Independent Inquiry into the Financial Sustainability of NSW Local Government (2006) , councils have treated capital revenues as operating income and undervalued assets and depreciation. This has given the impression that they have had operating surplus when they may have been in deficit. This is misleading but allowed under the Australian Accounting Standard 27. The LGI is against the practice and recommends capital revenues be excluded from operating In Tables 1 and 2 , tax revenue by level of government exemplifies the dependence of state and local government on commonwealth grants and further emphasizes vertical fiscal imbalance across government in Australia. Comrie, 2012. In defining the impact of vertical fiscal imbalance on local government in Australia, Comrie (2012) highlights that 10% of local government revenue is made up of grants and subsidies from the commonwealth government via the states. 35 Rate revenue is subject to rate pegging.
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The following sections review the literature on local government rates and Section 94 developer contributions. A summary of the contrasting merits of each is considered as a prelude to the study which examines changes in the relativity of these sources of revenue over the current and earlier study periods.
Council rates: Land value rate pegging and perceptions of this tax
Recurrent income derived from land taxation (local municipal rates and state land tax ) are sometimes considered to be the most efficient and least distortive source of local government income (Australian Federal Government 2011). Australia's current land tenure system is important for property taxation in two ways. Smiley (1997) states that without a land tenure system, land cannot be treated as immobile, nor can it be allocated to a single owner. Thus the increased value created from land (through supply and demand) can be measured and subsequently taxed on the value of the fee simple (Smiley 1997) .
Unlike labour, the fixed nature of land means that as profits from land use rises (i.e. through development) so does the value of land. This is an important principle underpinning land as a base of recurrent taxation, as it is deemed to be the most neutral and least distortive base on which to impose a tax on property (Arnott 2000) . NSW continues to levy council rates on land value, in contrast to the states of Victoria and South Australia which levy local government rates on improved value. Table 3 sets out the diverse bases on which local government rates are determined across the states of Australia. Because rate pegging applies to councils overall general income, and not for individual properties, it is possible for rates to be increased by more than the rate peg for some property owners and less for 
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Rate pegging is designed to improve social equity but is one of the most controversial restrictions on the growth of rates. The findings of IPART (2008) show overall revenue growth in NSW as similar to that of other states where the rate peg is not imposed. Effectively NSW councils have sourced funds elsewhere (Independant Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal 2008) . Wijeweera and Dollery (2010) argue that this creates pricing inequity (Wijeweera and Dollery 2010) . The Productivity Commission (2008) notes that these additional sources of revenue have not offset the rate peg very significantly in recent years (Productivity Commission 2008). Table 4 contrasts with the findings of IPART (2008), as NSW with the largest land area per capita has only the fourth highest revenue from rates. However, it is the third highest state reliant on grants and subsidies. Source: 2008/09 Local Government National Report cited by Comrie (2012) Principally the rate peg percentage reflects the increase in the costs that a typical council would incur in delivering services comparable to the previous year (Independant Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, 2008) . The economic rationale sees local government as a monopoly, and as such can provide services inefficiently or at excessive prices. The rate peg is imposed by higher tiers of government to regulate this and ensure efficiency and equity in raising revenue (Wijeweera and Dollery, 2010) .
Some arguments for the rate pegging process are that it manages poor governance and controls the provision of non-core services and infrastructure that might prove unsustainable. The rate peg is designed to encourage the supply of non-core services and infrastructure by the private sector.
However Wijeweera and Dollery (2010) argue that this effect does not meet with 'empirical reality' due to the ongoing shift of local government responsibilities of services and infrastructure to services and people (Wijeweera and Dollery, 2010) .
Both IPART (2008) and the Productivity Commission (2008) suggest that rate pegging may be limiting the growth of capital expenditure for NSW councils compared to other Australian states.
However IPART(2008) concludes that due to the 'lumpy' nature of infrastructure expenditure and
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other influential factors, a clear connection could not be made (Independant Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, 2008, Productivity Commission, 2008) .
The key arguments made against rate pegging are that they lack transparency, discourage medium to long term planning, and are not reflective of council cost movements and council accountability to their community (Independant Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, 2008) . The Productivity Commission (2008) 
Section 94 contributions
The second form of revenue reviewed in this paper is Section 94 contributions. This tax is, to some extent, designed to tax those who benefit from the infrastructure directly. It is efficient in that those who create the demand for infrastructure and those who use it pay for it (Vickers et al., 2010 , Dollery, 2005 (Simpson, 1989) . The Simpson Inquiry led to the requirement of all councils to prepare Section 94 contribution plans, as a requirement before they were able to extract developer contributions. This plan is used to detail the use of Section 94 and to show that there is a clear 'nexus' 36 between the development that has raised the Section 94 contribution and the project funded by the Section 94 contribution (Cox, 1991) .
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McNeil and Dollery (2001) Barnes and Dollery (1996) identified that smaller councils located in low growth areas found developer contributions to be an inefficient source of funds. Significantly, administration costs increased for these smaller LGA's (Barnes and Dollery, 1996) . Further, such charges if not applied consistently, may cause the movement of development and redevelopment from one LGA to another.
Vickers et al (2010) describe developer charges as being consistent with the benefit principle of equity and encourage efficient consumption of goods and use of resources. The benefit principle is essentially those who benefit from the services or infrastructure should pay for them. It is consistent with the theory that an increase in the value of property should be taxed as a 'public economic rent' (Vickers et al, 2010) . In achieving the benefit principle, this value tax, is often referred to as the betterment tax and resembles a type of horizontal equity (Applied Economics and New England Education and Research, 2008) . A problem identified with a betterment tax is that it has tended to discourage development and the boundary of increased value is difficult to determine (Vickers et al, 2010) . and maintain the infrastructure with as much of the revenue generated staying within the community (Carrozza, 2010) . Alternatively, IPART recommends 'adjustments' be made to the calculation of developer charges when inefficient operations occur, however again McNeill and Dollery (2000) argue the difficulty in quantifying the degree of inefficiency a point also raised by IPART (2008) ( McNeill and Dollery, 2000a) .
Literature summary
The Australian Constitution underpins the current revenue and expenditure arrangements of Local Government has remained an operational arm of the state government and Mangioni (2006) notes that because Local Government is not a constitutional level of government it doesn't have the same taxing or revenue raising powers of higher tiers of government.
Australia's land tenure system has enabled property taxation to operate. The Australian Federal Government (2011), Smiley (1997) , Arnott (2000) and Vickers et al (2010) Section 94 developer contributions are generally designed to tax those who benefit from infrastructure directly through the uplift in value provided in the development approval process. Vickers et al (2010) and Dollery (2010) agree that it is efficient in that those who create the demand for infrastructure and those who use the infrastructure pay for it. However Barnes and Dollery (1996) In summary, both rates and developer contributions continue to play an important role in funding local government in NSW. Despite inefficiencies in their current application the study that follows exmines their changes in relativity of these sources over two study periods.
Research methods and analysis
This research provides an analysis of the relativity of revenue from rates and Section 94 developer contributions and spans the period of the GFC. This was intended so trends over different economic cycles may be examined. By comparing the results of Section 94 and rates with the data and results of research undertaken by Barnes and Dollery (1996) we are able to identify time trends, both recent and long term.
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Similar to the method adopted by Barnes and Dollery (1996) , the data is grouped into three groups enabling statistical methods to be employed. The mean of Section 94 and rate revenue in constant Australian dollars and per capita is calculated for each council, and the coefficient of variation, which shows the variability of payments, is determined (Myers and Well, 2003; Miles and Shevlin, 2009; Barnes and Dollery, 1996; Asadoorian and Kantarelis, 2005; Croucher, 2008) A mixed methodological approach is used in this study, as depicted by Creswell (2009) , who discusses the merits of using one method which informs the other, strengthening the limitations impacted by the use of either qualitative or quantitative paradigms (Creswell, 2009) .
Archival retrieval and analysis is a process that focuses on past and contemporary events. The methods used in the data collection and analysis process included archival retrieval of information held by the Department of Local Government NSW on Section 94 contributions and rates. This data is defined by Sorensen (1995) as secondary information and was initially distilled using data grouping and coding which is a qualitative method of refining the data (Sorensen, 1995) .
Archival retrieval and analysis is a more appropriate analysis method than experimental strategies, surveys or case studies because neither one of these methods allows the statistical analysis and comparison of data from financial statements (Walliman and Baiche, 2001 ).
In addition to the data source mentioned above the research will also rely on secondary data obtained The analysis of the data was undertaken using PAWS 18, a statistical program used to derive the mean and standard deviation. It was then used to determine the coefficient of variation (Norusis, 2009) which can compare the degree of variation from one data set to another even when the means are different. It is the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean that can reveal the stability or variability of rates and Section 94 contributions (Zady, 2009) .
By relying on two types of data sources, a limitation occurred due to the variation of reporting requirements and different samples sizes. Because of time constraints it was necessary to reduce the population to a sample of 45 councils (out of 152 for the whole of NSW) for the four years ending June 2010. In 1992-93 the data was obtained by using the whole population of LGA's in NSW.
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To reduce the impact of these variations a stratified sampling method was employed. The stratified method of sampling allows the population to be divided into groups. It is preferred over random sampling techniques as there's a number of small LGA's but only a few that are large. Because the population sub-sets can be of different sizes in a stratified method, the selection is intended to reflect the current ratio or variations between each LGA (Croucher, 2008) .
Data analysis and conclusions
The data has been presented in four tables:
• Table 5 shows the results for the whole sample of the four years ending June 2010 compared with the data results of the 1992-93 study.
• Table 6 is a break-up of the information in Table 1 . The information is dissected into three categories of population sizes each having 15
LGA's to represent it. The first category is less than or equal to 40,000 (Group 1), the next is greater than 40,000 and less than or equal to 80,000 (Group 2), and the last category is an absolute population of larger than 80,000 (Group 3).
• Table 7 is an overview of the total income of local government.
• Table 8 sets out the results of the coefficient of variation which is used to determine the variability between Section 94 contributions and rates as a funding source for local government. Statistics, 1996) )(Data on total income is less grant revenue, Currency -AUD$)
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The information displayed in Table 5 shows the mean percentage of income and income per capita for rates, Section 94 and own source income in constant dollars for local government for the year 1992-93
and for the four years ending June 2010. This allows for a comparison between the years, type of income and extent of use of rates and Section 94 contributions.
The results set out in Table 5 Section 94 is a one-time charge and is a capital revenue rather than recurrent. Consequently councils who are more reliant on user charges and fees revenue are more susceptible to sustainability problems due to the lumpy nature of the funding received. As a capital revenue it is important that Section 94 is used for capital costs, as use for recurrent costs can be dangerous for development budgets and financial capabilities Dollery, 2001, Independant Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, 2008) .
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Rates on the other hand are a recurrent income which, to a degree, allows councils to forecast future revenues. Even though rates comprise a greater percentage of own-source income, the results indicate they are far from becoming the main supporting revenue of local government. Given restrictions such as rate pegging, this source of revenue continues to be limited by increases imposed by state government. Table 6 elaborates on the information in Table 5 . It splits the data into three population group categories.
For the four years ending June 2010, Group 1 has a mean Section 94, as a percentage of own source income, of between 1.79% and 4.36%. Group 2 was between 5.58% and 9.17% and group 3 was 2.16% and 6.94%. This suggests that for councils with a population of over 40,000 and less than or equal to 80,000 (Group 2), Section 94 achieves the highest percentage of income. This is also the case Statistics, 1996) )(Data on total income is less grant revenue, Currency -AUD$)
Rate revenue for Group 1 for the four years ending June 2010 has a mean percentage of own source income of between 37.22% and 40%. Group 2 is between 46.23% and 50.17%, and Group 3 of between 50.17% and 50.98%. Unlike Section 94, these results show that the greater the population the greater portion of income is sourced from rate revenue. Therefore, for larger populated local government, rate revenue is a far better and viable source of revenue.
Interestingly, on a per capita basis, rate revenue was higher for Group 1 with the highest charge of higher rate peg to some property owners and less for others (Independant Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, 2008) .
The issuing of land values every four to six years for the determination of rates may have meant a lag in rates calculation and may have contributed to its stability as a revenue source (Scorsone and Plerhoples, 2010) . A change in the value of property could have shown a delayed response to the GFC, but these changes did not reflect in the results and were not tested in this research.
On a per capita basis total own-source income for all three groups showed a dip in revenue during the These results are evidence of other incomes such as commonwealth grants particularly for Group 1. Table 7 Rates and annual charges make up the most substantial portion of local government income. This is closely followed by grants (capital and operation) and then user charges and fees (which include Section 94 contributions). These make up the next largest portion of income for local governments with an average of 15%. What is not clear from this table, given the relatively short period of analysis, is a clear trend in any of these revenue types. Due to the 'ad hoc' manner that Section 94 is levied; conceptually this income is more variable than rate revenue. In order to verify this difference in variability, the coefficient of variation was calculated for each of the four years ending June 2010 (Table 8 ).
For total contributions (without the population categorization), both the coefficient of variation of Section 94 contributions and rates was greater than >1, suggesting high variability. It was consistently high over the four years (see Table 4 during an economic downturn, rates revenue will be a more reliable income than Section 94 contributions.
When looking at the variability for the population categories, Group 2 had the lowest coefficient of variation for both Section 94 and rates, signifying that these revenue types are more reliable for a population size greater than 40,000 and less than 80,000. Group 1 showed the highest variability for both revenue sources, but is greater for Section 94 and is likely attributable to their 'ad hoc' and unplanned manner of collection for smaller LGA's. The results are similar to those of Barnes and Dollery (1996) .
The correlation coefficient was also tested for Section 94 contributions, for the three different groups of population sizes, to see if there were any significant relationships between the types of infrastructure funded. Rate revenue was not tested against any variables because there are no specific groups of expenditure types readily evident or quantifiable, unless obtained from each specific 
Conclusion
It is clear from the literature review that the main issues faced by local governments in NSW are that of sustainability resulting from increased commitments in infrastructure funding. The importance of council autonomy is evident and can be achieved, in one way, through the flexibility found in an increase of own-source revenue.
This paper examined two important sources of local government revenue, namely rates and Section 94 contributions, as a source of funding local government infrastructure and services. Whilst there is an increase in the use of these revenue types since the study undertaken by Barnes and Dollery (1996) , the findings of this research indicate the extent of use by councils is not adequate to support local government's financial autonomy. Nor is the application of these revenue types as efficient as economic theory suggests.
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According to Jimenez and Hendrick (2010) efficiency of local government may not be limited to their financial makeup and can extend to the phenomenon of urban sprawl which can lead to higher expenditure in public services and infrastructure. Whilst urban sprawl for the short term raises more Section 94 revenue, as evidenced in this research, Mc Gill (2010) agrees that there needs to be a more suitable process to generate infrastructure and service delivery.
A solution to improve sustainability is to improve internal operating efficiency of local government (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006, Independant Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, 2008) . A closer study on the expenditure of local government would be required which is an avenue for future research.
One suggestion by PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006) to help the sustainability of local government includes the development of a 'nationally consistent Local Government Body Financial and Asset Management Data' system. The findings of this report concur that the quality of data for analysis on the financial viability and sustainability of local governments is poor. Planning and development cannot be quality controlled or guided without these measures in place.
Overall the results of this research demonstrate the variability in two important revenue sources for local government. The research highlights the sustainability issues of local government and identifies the shortcomings of rates and Section 94 as a source of funding for local government in NSW. The application of the coefficient of variability, the assessment of the mean and analysis on a per capita basis, clearly indicates Section 94 is more volatile and susceptible to the economic climate than rate revenue. Rate revenue comprises a significant proportion of local government revenue and in larger
LGAs has likely contributed to recurrent sustainability.
Unfortunately, Section 94 contributions are limited to the development they are levied against and rate revenue is limited by rate pegging and section 500 of the Local Government Act NSW (Scorsone and Plerhoples, 2010; Wijeweera and Dollery, 2010) . Given their shortcomings, McGill (2010) supports the idea that higher tiers of government should remove restrictions by amending legislation to allow local governments the freedom to raise the necessary funding in line with the commitment to service and maintain the infrastructure within the local government areas.
